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This paper argues that a risk-averse worker's after-tax reservation wage encodes all the relevant information
about her welfare. This insight leads to a novel test for the optimality of unemployment insurance
based on the responsiveness of reservation wages to unemployment benefits. Some existing estimates
imply significant gains to raising the current level of unemployment benefits in the United States,
but highlight the need for more research on the determinants of reservation wages. Our approach complements















The goal of this paper is to develop a test for the optimal level of unemployment insurance
using a minimal amount of economic theory and a minimal amount of data. We approach this
by studying a risk-averse worker in a sequential job search setting (McCall, 1970). Our main
theoretical insight is that the worker’s after-tax reservation wage—the diﬀerence between
her reservation wage and the tax needed to fund the unemployment insurance system—
encodes all of the relevant information about her welfare. This is true regardless of whether
workers are able to borrow and lend to smooth their consumption, or whether they must
live hand-to-mouth.
Intuitively, the after-tax reservation wage tells us the take-home pay required to make
a worker indiﬀerent between working and remaining unemployed. Since take-home pay
translates directly into consumption, it is a valid measure of the worker’s utility. Given
the simplicity of the argument, it should not be surprising that this insight turns out to be
robust to many variations of our basic model.
To prove this result, we develop a formal dynamic model of job search with risk-aversion.
Workers draw wages from a known distribution and accepted jobs last for a ﬁxed amount
of time. In order to abstract from wealth eﬀects, we assume workers have constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA) preferences.1 We ﬁrst consider how workers behave when confronted
with an arbitrary level of unemployment beneﬁts and reemployment taxes. We ﬁnd that a
worker’s utility while unemployed is a monotone function of her after-tax reservation wage.
If she has no access to capital markets, her unemployment utility, measured in consumption
equivalent units, is equal to her after-tax reservation wage. If she can borrow and lend, it
is equal to her after-tax reservation wage plus the annuity value of her assets. This implies
that optimal unemployment insurance—the policy of an agency that chooses actuarially
fair unemployment beneﬁts and reemployment taxes to maximize an unemployed worker’s
utility—simply seeks to maximize the worker’s after tax reservation wage.
This insight leads to a novel test for the optimality of unemployment insurance: raising
beneﬁts is desirable whenever it raises the after-tax reservation wage. This criteria can be
decomposed into two eﬀects. On the one hand, higher beneﬁts reduce the cost of remaining
unemployed and therefore raise the pre-tax reservation wage. Thus, if the pre-tax reservation
1In Shimer and Werning (2005), we show that the behavior and insurance needs of a worker with constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences is similar to that of a worker with the same absolute risk aversion
and CARA preferences. Thus one might interpret the results we report here as an approximation for other
preferences.
1wage is very responsive to unemployment beneﬁts, raising unemployment beneﬁts has a
strong positive eﬀect on workers’ welfare. However, the increase in beneﬁts must be funded
by an increase in the employment tax. The higher is the unemployment rate or the more
responsive it is to unemployment beneﬁts, the greater is the needed increase in the tax. Our
optimality condition nets out both eﬀects.
While a large literature studies the responsiveness of unemployment or unemployment du-
ration to unemployment beneﬁts (e.g., Meyer, 1990), there is less research on the responsive-
ness of reservation wages to beneﬁts. Exceptions include Fishe (1982) and Feldstein and Poterba
(1984). Fishe (1982) uses information on actual wages to infer reservation wages, while
Feldstein and Poterba (1984) uses direct survey evidence on reservation wages. Both papers
ﬁnd that a $1 increase in beneﬁts may raise pre-tax reservation wages by as much as $0.44.
Feldstein and Poterba (1984) interpret this as evidence of the moral-hazard cost of raising
unemployment beneﬁts, but our approach turns this logic around, since our theory tells us
that the reservation wage measures the welfare of unemployed workers.
If the numbers in Fishe (1982) and Feldstein and Poterba (1984) are correct, we show
that the marginal eﬀect of a fully-funded increase in unemployment beneﬁts is large. Of
course, these estimates are at best valid for small policy changes; according to the model,
suﬃciently high unemployment beneﬁts would eventually eliminate all economic activity.
Moreover, more recent estimates of the responsiveness of reservation wages to beneﬁts are
smaller and imply that current beneﬁt levels are too high. In our view, the uncertainty
around this critical variable calls for more precise estimates of it, but doing so goes beyond
the scope of this paper.
Within the public ﬁnance literature, the standard approach to measuring optimal unem-
ployment insurance is based on the Baily (1978) test:
“The optimal unemployment insurance beneﬁt level is set when the proportional
drop in consumption resulting from unemployment, times the degree of relative
risk aversion of workers (evaluated at the level of consumption when unemployed)
is equal to the elasticity of the duration of unemployment with respect to balanced
budget increases in UI [unemployment insurance] beneﬁts and taxes.” (p. 390)
While this approach is close in spirit to the one we adopt here, we see several advantages
to our test. First, our test is entirely behavioral, while the Baily test requires independent
estimates of risk-aversion. Indeed, Chetty (2006) argues within a Baily framework that the
relevant risk-aversion parameter depends on the context and may be higher for unemploy-
2ment risk. In light of such concerns, the fact that our test does not requires selecting this,
or any other, parameter is particularly convenient.
Second, Chetty (2006) shows that in a dynamic environment, the Baily test requires a
long panel data set with information on total consumption. Unfortunately, no such data set
exists, so the best known implementation of the Baily test, Gruber (1997), uses panel data
on food expenditure. There are two main limitations to using food expenditure as a proxy
for total consumption: recent work by Aguiar and Hurst (2005) shows that the link between
food expenditure and food consumption is tenuous because of varying amounts of time spent
in household production; and food consumption is likely to react signiﬁcantly less than total
consumption to income or wealth shocks.2
Third, our exact test is robust to a number of extensions. In Section 6, we allow for the
possibility that jobs diﬀer both in their wage and in their average duration, that the duration
of a job is stochastic, that an unemployed worker’s search eﬀort aﬀects the arrival rate of
oﬀers, that workers are heterogeneous but there is a single unemployment beneﬁt system, that
unemployed workers may be recalled to their previous job, and that unemployed workers are
eligible for beneﬁts for only a ﬁnite amount of time. None of these extensions aﬀects our basic
conclusion that the after-tax reservation wage measures the welfare of the unemployed and
therefore none substantially alters our behavioral test for optimal unemployment insurance.
In contrast, although Chetty (2006) shows that extensions of the consumption-based
Baily test are possible, in our view they may be diﬃcult to implement because they require
an empirically challenging comparison of the average marginal utility of consumption during
employment with that during unemployment over the worker’s entire lifetime—a moment of
consumption data not analyzed by Gruber (1997), for example.3 Nevertheless, our model
can also deliver easily implementable consumption-based tests, but we point out that their
derivation uses the full structure of the model, is less robust than the new test we propose
here, and requires unexplored consumption measures from panel data.
As mentioned above, one challenge to implementing our behavioral test is that empirical
evidence on reservation wages is scarce. Our hope is that this paper, by underscoring its
usefulness as a welfare statistic, may lead to greater interest in reservation wage evidence,
2Indeed, Chetty (2006) extends the consumption test so that it applies to food consumption. Unfortu-
nately, the test then requires setting a parameter for the curvature of the utility function with respect to
food, instead of risk aversion.
3The Borch-Arrow condition for perfect insurance states that marginal utility should be equalized across
all states of nature. Absent full insurance, this condition fails and Chetty’s (2006) comparison provides a
metric for the extent of this failure.
3much as Baily’s (1978) theoretical contribution led to empirical research on how much con-
sumption declines when workers lose their job. Ultimately, the two tests are complementary.
Both assess the optimality of unemployment insurance, but exploit diﬀerent data sources.
Macroeconomists have generally taken a diﬀerent approach to optimal unemployment
insurance, calibrating a stochastic general equilibrium model and then performing policy
experiments within the model (Hansen and Imrohoroglu, 1992; Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000;
Alvarez and Veracierto, 2001). An advantage to this approach is that it can address issues
we neglect, such as the impact of unemployment insurance policy on capital accumulation.
But in order to do that, these papers rely heavily on the entire structure of the model and its
calibration, which sometimes obscures the economic mechanisms at work and their empirical
validity. This approach also makes evaluating the robustness of the results expensive. In
contrast, by focusing on the worker’s partial equilibrium problem—a component in richer
general equilibrium models—we are able to highlight, in a tractable way, the main tradeoﬀs
that seem important for understanding optimal unemployment insurance and to point out
how the relevant forces can be measured.
A third strand of the literature focuses on the timing of beneﬁts, and in particular, on
whether unemployment beneﬁts should fall during an unemployment spell (Shavell and Weiss,
1979; Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997). This paper emphasizes the optimal level of beneﬁts
but assumes that beneﬁts and taxes are constant over time.4 In Shimer and Werning (2005)
we argue that, provided workers are given enough liquidity to easily borrow against future
earnings,5 constant beneﬁts and taxes are optimal, or nearly so. Besides this diﬀerence in
emphasis, there are two modeling diﬀerences. The ﬁrst is that here we work in continuous
time rather than in discrete time, a superﬁcial change that simpliﬁes the algebra. More im-
portantly, here we allow for separations, so that workers experience multiple unemployment
spells. This generalization is important for any quantitative exercise focusing on the level of
beneﬁts.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: The next section presents our model
of sequential search. Section 3 analyzes how workers behave when confronted with constant
unemployment beneﬁts and constant taxes. We consider two ﬁnancial regimes. In the ﬁrst,
workers have unlimited access to borrowing and lending at a constant interest rate, subject
only to a no Ponzi-game condition. In the second, workers must live hand-to-mouth, con-
4Section 6.9 shows that our test for optimal unemployment insurance is robust even if beneﬁts end after
a ﬁnite amount of time; however, we do not examine the optimal timing of beneﬁts in that section.
5Such liquidity might be provided by unemployment insurance savings accounts (Feldstein, 2005).
4suming their income in each period. Section 4 describes the problem of an insurance agency
choosing the level of unemployment insurance subject to a budget constraint. Section 5
describes our new test for optimal unemployment insurance and discusses the available em-
pirical evidence that bears on the relevant parameters of that test. Section 6 considers
a number of generalizations to our model and shows that our test is unaﬀected by those
changes. Section 7 derives a version of the Baily (1978) test for our model, showing that
the exact test depends on all the details of the model and hence is less robust than our
behavioral test. We conclude in Section 8.
2 Unemployment and Sequential Search







where ρ > 0 represents the subjective discount rate in continuous time. We assume through-
out the body of the paper that the utility function exhibits CARA, U(c) = −e−γc with
coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion γ > 0.
At any moment in time a worker can be employed, at some wage w with t periods
remaining in the job, or unemployed. An employed worker produces a ﬂow of w units
of the single consumption good and pays an employment tax τ. When the job ends, she
becomes unemployed. An unemployed worker receives a beneﬁt b and waits for the arrival
of job opportunities. The worker receives an independent wage draw from a cumulative
distribution function F with Poisson arrival rate λ.6 When a worker gets a wage oﬀer, she
observes the wage and decides whether to accept or reject it. If she accepts, employment
commences immediately and the job lasts for exactly T ≤ ∞ periods.7 If she rejects, she
produces nothing and remains unemployed. The worker cannot recall past wage oﬀers. With
CARA preferences recall is not optimal, so this last assumption is not binding.
There is an unemployment insurance agency whose objective is to maximize an un-
employed worker’s utility8 by choosing a constant unemployment beneﬁt b and constant
6Section 6.4 shows that our results are robust if a worker’s search eﬀort aﬀects the arrival rate of job oﬀers.
That section also allows for the possibility that workers have preferences over consumption and leisure.
7Section 6.2 shows that our main results are robust if the worker draws both a wage and a job duration.
Section 6.3 shows they are robust if the duration of a job is uncertain. Section 6.8 shows they are robust if
unemployed workers may be recalled to their past wage.
8Section 6.5 shows that our results are robust if the unemployment insurance agency also values the
5employment tax τ,9 subject to the constraint that the expected cost of the unemployment
insurance system is zero when discounted at the interest rate r = ρ.10 Let B ≡ b+τ denote
the net subsidy to unemployment, the sum of the beneﬁt a worker receives while unemployed
and the employment tax she avoids paying. We show below that a worker’s behavior depends
only on the net unemployment subsidy.
We consider two ﬁnancial environments. In the ﬁrst, the worker has access to ﬁnan-
cial markets, namely a riskless borrowing and savings technology, facing only the budget
constraint
˙ a(t) = ra(t) + y(t) − c(t),
and the usual no Ponzi-game condition.11 Here a(t) is assets, c(t) is consumption, and y(t)
represents current income, equal to the current after-tax wage w(t) − τ if the worker is
employed, or beneﬁts b, otherwise. The rate of return r is the same for the worker and
the unemployment insurance agency. In the second environment, the worker lives hand-to-
mouth. She has no access to a savings technology, a(t) = 0 for all t, and so must consume
her income in each period, c(t) = y(t).
We study these two extremes because they span the spectrum of ﬁnancial environments
with incomplete markets and because both cases are analytically tractable. The intermediate
cases cannot be solved in closed form but could be studied numerically to see whether our










This is the present value of receiving an additional unit of income for the next t periods.
The present value of income from a new job with wage w is αTw. Note that in the limit as
r converges to zero, αt = t.
utility of currently-employed workers. Section 6.6 shows they are robust if workers are heterogeneous and
the agency has access to lump-sum transfers to address any redistributional issues, while Section 6.7 argues
that the after-tax reservation wage is still critical even in the absence of lump-sum transfers.
9In Shimer and Werning (2005) we show that this simple unemployment insurance system is optimal
when the worker can borrow and lend at interest rate r and jobs last forever. In any case, Section 6.9 shows
that our main results are robust if unemployment beneﬁts decline during an unemployment spell.
10Section 6.1 shows that our main results are robust if the discount rate and interest rate are not equal.
11The no-Ponzi condition states that debt must grow slower than the interest rate, limt→∞ e−rta(t) ≥ 0,
with probability one. Together with the budget constraints ˙ a(t) = ra(t) + y(t) − c(t), this is equivalent to
imposing a single present-value constraint, with probability one.
63 Worker Behavior
We start by characterizing how a worker behaves when confronted with any constant beneﬁt
system (b,τ). We ﬁrst consider a worker with no liquidity problems, that is, a worker with
access to borrowing and lending at rate r. We then turn to the opposite end of the spectrum
and consider a hand-to-mouth worker who must consume her current income.
3.1 Workers with Liquidity
We now prove the following results. A worker who can borrow and lend at the interest
rate r = ρ keeps her consumption constant during an employment spell since she faces no
uncertainty. She saves, however, gradually accumulating assets while on the job. In con-
trast, consumption steadily declines during unemployment, because remaining unemployed
represents a negative permanent-income shock. This is accompanied by dissavings: assets
are run down during unemployment spells. Consumption jumps up when an unemployed
worker becomes employed, because ﬁnding a job is a discrete positive shock to permanent-
income. When unemployed, the worker uses a constant reservation wage policy, accepting
jobs above some threshold ¯ w. Finally, the after-tax reservation wage is a suﬃcient statistic
for the welfare of the unemployed. Formally:
Proposition 1 Assume a worker has access to ﬁnancial markets. For a given policy (b,τ),
the lifetime utility of an unemployed worker with assets a is
Vu(a) =
U(ra + ¯ w − τ)
r
. (1)
The consumption of an unemployed worker with assets a and of an employed worker with
assets a, t periods remaining on the job, and a wage w are respectively
cu(a) = ra + ¯ w − τ, (2)
c(a,t,w) = r
￿
a + αt(w − ¯ w)
￿
+ ¯ w − τ. (3)
The reservation wage ¯ w is constant and solves








rαT(w − ¯ w)
￿￿
dF(w). (4)
The proof is in the appendix.
7For the purpose of this paper, the most important part of this proposition is equation (1).
If a worker were to remain unemployed forever her lifetime utility would be U(ra)/r. Thus
¯ w − τ is the value an unemployed worker places on access to the labor market, measured in
units of per-period consumption.
To get some intuition for equation (1), suppose a worker could accept a job at wage w
that lasts forever, so her after-tax income would be w − τ. With the discount rate equal to
the interest rate, a worker with a concave utility function U would keep her consumption
constant and so would consume this income plus the annuity value on her assets, ra. That
is, she would consume c(a,∞,w) = ra+w−τ, her assets would be constant, ˙ a = 0, and her
lifetime utility would be U(ra + w − τ)/r. Now deﬁne ¯ w so that an unemployed worker is
indiﬀerent between continuing to search and working forever at ¯ w, Vu(a) ≡ U(ra+ ¯ w−τ)/r.
This is equivalent to equation (1). The proof of the proposition in the appendix shows that
workers are in fact indiﬀerent about continuing to search or working at ¯ w for any amount of
time, so ¯ w is the reservation wage.12
3.2 Hand-to-Mouth Workers
We now consider worker behavior under an extreme alternative, ﬁnancial autarky, so a worker
must consume her income in each period: caut
u = b while unemployed and caut(w) = w − τ
while employed at wage w. Under ﬁnancial autarky, a worker’s consumption will typically
jump up when she ﬁnds a job and down when she leaves her job. Although this is qualitatively
diﬀerent than when the worker has access to ﬁnancial markets, one critical property is
unchanged, the worker’s lifetime utility depends only on her after-tax reservation wage:
Proposition 2 Assume a worker must consume her income. For a given policy (b,τ), the




U( ¯ waut − τ)
ρ
, (5)
where ¯ waut is the reservation wage, the solution to
U( ¯ w








12In general, workers may be willing to take a wage below ¯ w for a while, accumulate assets, and eventually
quit to search for a higher wage. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) explore this in an environment with decreasing
absolute risk aversion. This possibility is absent from our setup because of the CARA utility assumption.
8The proof is in the appendix. This result is independent of the form of the period utility
function U. However, with CARA utility U(c1 − c2) = −U(c1)/U(c2), so we can rewrite
equation (6) as
U( ¯ w








which implies that ¯ w is determined as a function of B = b + τ.
It is worth noting that, since the reservation wage summarizes a worker’s utility both un-
der perfect liquidity and ﬁnancial autarky, the diﬀerence in the reservation wage summarizes
the value of access to ﬁnancial markets. More precisely,
Proposition 3 A hand-to-mouth worker has a lower reservation wage than a worker with
access to capital markets. Moreover, the diﬀerence in their reservation wages is the utility
gain from access to capital markets, measured in units of per-period consumption.
The proof is in the appendix.
4 Optimal Unemployment Insurance
4.1 The Unemployment Insurance Agency’s Problem
We now turn to the problem of an unemployment insurance agency that chooses actuarially
fair unemployment beneﬁts b and employment taxes τ to maximize the worker’s utility given
by equation (1) (if the worker has liquidity) or equation (5) (if the worker is hand-to-mouth).
In both cases, this is equivalent to maximizing the worker’s after-tax reservation wage.
To derive the actuarially fair relation between beneﬁts and taxes, consider the net present
value cost C of the program, which must satisfy
rC = b + λ(1 − F(¯ w))
￿
e
−rTC − αTτ − C
￿
.
In words, the ﬂow cost, rC, is comprised of current beneﬁts outlays, b, plus the opportunity
of becoming employed, which occurs with arrival rate λ(1−F( ¯ w)) and reduces costs from C
to e−rTC −αTτ, since employed workers pay taxes and become unemployed after some time
T. Setting C = 0 gives the agency’s budget constraint
Db = αTτ, (8)




is the expected duration of an unemployment spell. It will prove
useful to consider as an approximation the limit as r → 0, so that αT = T and the budget
constraint becomes
ub = (1 − u)τ, (9)
where u ≡ D/(T + D) is the fraction of time a worker is unemployed, or equivalently, the
unemployment rate.
The unemployment insurance agency recognizes that the worker will set her reservation
wage optimally given the chosen policy. Putting this together, the optimal unemployment
insurance problem is to choose beneﬁts b, taxes τ, and a reservation wage ¯ w to maximize ¯ w−τ
subject to two constraints: the worker sets her reservation wage according to equation (4)
(liquidity) or equation (7) (hand-to-mouth); and the insurance must be actuarially fair,
equation (8). Let {b∗,τ∗} denote the optimal policy.
To see whether unemployment insurance is optimal, all we need to know is how an
actuarially fair increase in taxes and beneﬁts aﬀects a worker’s after-tax reservation wage.
It is not necessary to make any assumptions about risk-aversion, discount rates, the speed of
ﬁnding a job, the duration of a job, the distribution of wage oﬀers, or about whether workers
have liquidity or must consume hand-to-mouth since workers’ utility is a monotone function
of the after-tax reservation wage ¯ w − τ.
While this result is theoretically appealing, it may be diﬃcult to implement because it
may be hard to discern how much taxes must rise to balance an increase in beneﬁts. In
principle this question might be left to a budgetary authority like the Congressional Budget
Oﬃce, but such an organization would still need to understand how much the increase in
beneﬁts raises unemployment duration. Instead, our behavioral test uses information on
how unemployment beneﬁts aﬀect the pre-tax reservation wage and on the elasticity of
unemployment duration with respect to beneﬁts to characterize how taxes must change and
hence to characterize optimal policy.
4.2 A Behavioral Test
Equation (4) or equation (7) implies that the reservation wage depends on unemployment
beneﬁts and taxes, ¯ w(b,τ); let D(b,τ) ≡ 1/
￿
λ(1 − F(¯ w(b,τ)))
￿
denote average duration as
a function of b and τ. It follows that the resource constraint (8) deﬁnes taxes as a function






where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The denominator is positive if a tax cut reduces
the ﬁscal surplus, i.e., we are on the correct side of the Laﬀer curve. With CARA utility
and either perfect liquidity or hand-to-mouth consumption, the reservation wage and hence
unemployment duration depends only on the sum of beneﬁts and taxes (see equations (4) and
(7), respectively), so Db = Dτ. Then letting εD,b ≡ bDb(b,τ)/D(b,τ) be the the elasticity of







Next, since unemployment beneﬁts should maximize ¯ w(b,τ(b))−τ(b), a necessary condition
for optimal beneﬁts is
¯ wb(b
∗,τ







where as usual subscripts denote partial derivatives. Again, ¯ wb = ¯ wτ under CARA utility,
and so combining this equation with equation (10) gives our test for optimal beneﬁts:









If the left-hand-side of equation (11) is larger than the right-hand-side, a marginal in-
crease in beneﬁts raises the worker’s after-tax reservation wage and so is welfare-improving.
It is convenient to focus on the limit as r converges to zero. Following the same logic,












where εu,b is the elasticity of the unemployment rate with respect to beneﬁts. This also follows
from equation (11) as r → 0 using εu,b = (1−u)εD,b. This approximation is good for realistic
values of the discount rate. More importantly, we show in Section 6 that equation (12) is
robust to numerous extensions of our basic model.
11Our theory provides some guidance on how responsive the reservation wage is to un-
employment beneﬁts. Diﬀerentiating equation (4) or equation (7), we can prove that ¯ wb ≥
D/(αT +D), and strictly so if workers are risk averse. However, to see whether equation (11)
holds requires looking at the data.
5 Available Evidence
To implement the test proposed in Proposition 4, we need to know ﬁve numbers: the interest
rate r, the duration of a job T, the mean duration of an unemployment spell D, the elasticity
of duration with respect to beneﬁts εD,b, and the responsiveness of the reservation wage to
beneﬁts ¯ wb. This section starts by examining evidence on the ﬁrst four numbers, the right
hand side of equation (11), and then considers the last number, the left hand side of the
equation.
5.1 Threshold for the Response of Reservation Wages to Beneﬁts
The interest rate r, the duration of a job T, and the mean duration of an unemployment
spell D determine D/(αT + D), which is approximately equal to the unemployment rate
u. Our results are therefore sensitive to the choice of the unemployment rate. We target
a 5.6 percent unemployment rate, equal to the average value in the United States between
1948 and 2005. We think of a time period as a week and set the interest rate at r = 0.001,
equivalent to an annual interest rate of 5.3 percent. The mean duration of an in-progress
unemployment spell between 1948 and 2005 was D = 13.4 weeks and so we set T = 225 to
hit the target unemployment rate. Together this implies D/(αT + D) = 0.062.
We turn next to the elasticity of duration with respect to beneﬁts, εD,b, the remaining
unknown on the right hand side of equation (11). Perhaps the best-known study of this
number is Meyer (1990), who uses administrative data from the Continuous Wage and Beneﬁt
History (CWBH). The records cover men who received unemployment beneﬁts in twelve
states from 1978 to 1983 and include information on the level and potential duration of
beneﬁts, and on pre-unemployment earnings. Katz and Meyer (1990) explain that the source
of variation in beneﬁts in Meyer’s data include nonlinearities in beneﬁt schedules, legislative
changes, and the erosion of real beneﬁts due to ﬁxed nominal schedules between legislative
changes. By including state ﬁxed eﬀects and past wages in their regressions, both papers
eﬀectively control for endogeneity of beneﬁt levels. Moreover, these controls make it unlikely
12that workers who receive high beneﬁts relative to their past wage and relative to other
workers in their state anticipate paying relatively high taxes in the future. Thus these papers
convincingly estimate the ‘partial’ elasticity εD,b that is needed, holding taxes constant.13
In his preferred estimate, Meyer (1990, Table V, speciﬁcation 5) ﬁnds that a one percent
increase in unemployment beneﬁts reduces the baseline hazard rate of ﬁnding a job by 0.88
percent. Since the hazard rate is the inverse of expected unemployment duration, this implies
εD,b = 0.88. Combined with D/(αT + D) = 0.062, the right hand side of equation (11)
evaluates to 0.117. Reasonable parameter changes do not aﬀect this number much. For
example, some of Meyer’s (1990) other estimates in Table V show an elasticity as small as
0.53, while Katz and Meyer (1990) ﬁnd an elasticity of 0.54. Krueger and Meyer (2002, p.
2351) call 0.5 “not an unreasonable rough summary” of the literature on εD,b. This smaller
number would reduce the right hand side to 0.094. Conversely, if unemployment duration
were twice as long, D = 26.4, but job duration is also twice as long, T = 450, leaving the
unemployment rate unchanged, the right hand side increases to 0.129.
These numbers represent a threshold for the responsiveness of the reservation wage to
beneﬁts that determines whether changes in beneﬁts improve welfare and the best direction
of any beneﬁt change. For example, the point estimate 0.117, obtained above from Meyer’s
preferred estimate, implies that if a worker’s reservation wage rises by more than $0.117
for every $1 increase in beneﬁts, then such an increase improves welfare. Conversely, if the
response is lower then beneﬁts should be decreased. Beneﬁts are locally optimal only when
the response of the reservation wage equals this threshold.
5.2 An Ideal Experiment
Before reviewing the available evidence on the responsiveness of the reservation wage to ben-
eﬁts, we discuss two properties that an ideal measure should possess. First, we require an
unbiased measure of reservation wages.14 As we discuss below, our reading of the literature
suggests that workers can answer questions about their reservation wage, but estimates of
reservation wages using administrative wage data will also always be useful. Second, we
require variation in beneﬁts that is orthogonal to any omitted characteristics of the worker
or the economic environment. This is achieved most directly via deliberate experimenta-
13Most of the theoretical literature has interpreted these numbers as the ‘total’ elasticity of duration with
respect to an increase in beneﬁts and an actuarially fair increase in taxes. One can show that the partial
elasticity εD,b = ˆ εD,bαT/((1 + ˆ εD,b)D + αT) < ˆ εD,b, where ˆ εD,b is the total elasticity.
14If there are non-wage components of compensation then we require a measure of the reservation wage
that holds these job attributes ﬁxed.
13tion; Meyer (1995) documents that U.S. states are sometimes willing to undertake such
experiments. In the absence of experiments, however, it should still be possible to exploit
nonlinearities in beneﬁt schedules, combined with a rich set of controls for local labor market
conditions, to obtain the desired variation. Meyer (1990) and Katz and Meyer (1990) show
that this is feasible when measuring the impact of beneﬁts on duration. It should also be fea-
sible when measuring the impact of beneﬁts on reservation wages. Some other properties are
also desirable: larger data sets will yield tighter estimates, which is particularly important
since reservation wages are measured with error; and if we are concerned with the optimality
of the current United States unemployment system, we must use U.S. data since the desired
slope parameter ¯ wb is likely to vary across countries.
5.3 Direct Evidence on Reservation Wages
15 years ago, Devine and Kiefer (1991, Chapter 4) surveyed the existing evidence on the
behavior of reservation wages. The ﬁrst problem this literature confronted was how to
measure reservation wages. Unlike unemployment duration, administrative records do not
have any direct information on reservation wages. Instead, Kasper (1967) used data from
the Minnesota Department of Employment Security, which asked workers simply “what wage
are you seeking?” Barnes (1975) looked at registered unemployed workers in 12 cities who
were asked their “lowest acceptable wage.” Sant (1977) examined the 1966 cohort of the
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Males (NLSY), which from 1967 to 1969 asked “what
wage are you willing to accept?” Holzer (1987) provides some validation that this type of
question contains useful information. Using data from a later cohort of the NLSY, he ﬁnds
that workers with higher reservation wages are less likely to accept a job oﬀer (Table 4) but
earn a higher wage when they do take a job (Table 5). In any case, the variation in sample
selection and question design complicates any analysis of reservation wages.
Feldstein and Poterba (1984) were the ﬁrst to examine how self-reported reservation
wages respond to unemployment beneﬁts. They study a supplement to the May 1976 Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS) which asked 2,228 unemployment insurance recipients “What
is the lowest wage or salary you would accept (before deductions)?” The answers are sur-
prisingly high, on average seven percent above their previous wage. As subsequent authors
have noted, this casts some doubt on their results.
In their main analysis, Feldstein and Poterba (1984) regress the ratio of a worker’s reser-
vation wage, ¯ w, to their last wage, w0, on the ratio of their beneﬁt, b, to w0 and a number
14of controls.15 They run the regression separately for workers reporting diﬀerent reasons for
unemployment. In Table 4, they report that a one percentage point increase in b/w0 raises
¯ w/w0 by 0.13 and 0.42 percentage points, so ¯ wb ∈ [0.13,0.42]. The lowest slope estimate
is for job losers on layoﬀ and the highest is for other job losers; the slope estimate for job
leavers is 0.29.
Although this study advanced our understanding of reservation wages, it has some im-
portant shortcomings. First, if the last wage is measured with error, the main coeﬃcient
estimate is biased towards 1 and hence overstates the true elasticity. Second, the source
of variation in their main independent variable, the ratio of beneﬁts to the last wage, is
unclear. To the extent that there is a third factor correlated with both the beneﬁt ratio and
the reservation wage ratio, their results are biased. Plausible candidates include human cap-
ital or any systematic correlation between beneﬁts and local labor market conditions. The
authors include control variables to try to soak up such variation, but it seems unlikely that
they are able to capture all the relevant dimensions. For example, states that oﬀer higher
unemployment beneﬁts may diﬀer systematically along other dimensions. At a minimum,
taxes must be higher to fund these beneﬁts, which means Feldstein and Poterba (1984) mea-
sure the impact of an actuarially fair increase in beneﬁts and taxes on reservation wages,
¯ wb(b,τ)(1+τ′(b)). But it is also likely that other social insurance programs and the relevant
taxes covary with unemployment beneﬁts. In their analysis, the eﬀect of these programs is
loaded on to unemployment beneﬁts.
Despite these shortcomings, it is worth understanding the quantitative implications of
Feldstein and Poterba’s (1984) estimates. They imply substantial gains from raising unem-
ployment beneﬁts.16 A $1 balanced-budget increase in unemployment beneﬁts raises the
after-tax reservation wage by
¯ wb(b,τ)(1 + τ
′(b)) − τ
′(b) =
¯ wb(b,τ)(αT + D(b,τ)) − D(b,τ)(1 + εD,b(b,τ))
αT − D(b,τ)εD,b(b,τ)
,
or $0.34 for job losers not on layoﬀ. In other words, the net welfare gain for an unemployed
worker is equivalent to increasing her consumption by 34 cents at all dates in the future. To
15The controls include age, sex, number of years of education, and dummies for whites, married men, a
working spouse, and for the receipt of welfare payments and other supplementary income. The authors note
that theory often provides little guidance on how these variables should aﬀect the reservation wage.
16Curiously, Feldstein and Poterba (1984) interpret their estimates of the responsiveness of reservation
wages to beneﬁts as an argument for lowering unemployment beneﬁts because of the moral hazard costs.
Our model shows that, on the contrary, if the reservation wage is suﬃciently responsive to beneﬁts, then
beneﬁts must be serving their purpose, improving the welfare of unemployed workers.
15get a rough sense of the magnitude of this number, there are about 135 million workers in
the United States economy, with about 7.7 million unemployed at any point in time. Giving
every unemployed worker, including those not currently collecting unemployment beneﬁts,
an extra $1 per week would cost approximately $400 million per year. The net welfare gain
is equivalent to (somehow) raising the consumption of all workers by $0.34 per week, for a
total of $2.4 billion per year. Of course, even if these estimates are correct, they are only
correct locally. Raising beneﬁts by $1000 per week would probably not yield $2.4 trillion per
year in additional consumption-equivalent utility.
In any case, more recent studies using diﬀerent data and sometimes diﬀerent method-
ologies have often reached diﬀerent conclusions.17 Although it is not the main purpose of
their paper, DellaVigna and Paserman (2005, Appendix Table E1) regress the log of the
self-reported reservation wage on a dummy for whether the worker received unemploy-
ment insurance beneﬁts and numerous controls using data from the NLSY. They ﬁnd
that receiving beneﬁts raises the reservation wage by 4.7 percent, signiﬁcantly smaller than
Feldstein and Poterba (1984) estimate, and they cannot reject the null hypothesis that it
has no eﬀect. There are again some serious concerns with using this study for our purpose.
First, it is small, with only 1,010 unemployed workers who reported all the necessary infor-
mation. Second, the measure of beneﬁts is binary, which makes it diﬃcult to compare with
the desired slope ¯ wb. Perhaps more importantly, only 12.9 percent of unemployed workers
in the sample receive beneﬁts, much lower than in the population as a whole. This suggests
the possibility of a strong selection bias. Finally, although the authors include numerous
control variables, they do not attempt to address the possible endogeneity of unemployment
beneﬁts or the correlation of beneﬁts and other omitted policy variables.
5.4 Indirect Evidence on Reservation Wages
Another approach to measuring reservation wages is to infer them from data on accepted
wages. Perhaps the earliest such evidence comes indirectly from Ehrenberg and Oaxaca
(1976), who ﬁnd that workers who receive higher unemployment beneﬁts get higher wage
jobs.
To see what this implies about reservation wages requires more structure. Fishe (1982)
17There are also numerous studies using non-U.S. data sources; see, for example, Jones (1988),
van den Berg (1990), Gorter and Gorter (1993), Jones (2001), and Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001). While
these cannot tell us anything about the optimality of the current U.S. unemployment insurance system, they
may provide lessons on how to properly measure the impact of unemployment beneﬁts on reservation wages.
16uses the CWBH ﬁles for Florida, a 5 percent sample of state residents from 1971 to 1974.
Since this is administrative data, measurement error should be minimal. But since it does
not contain any direct information on reservation wages, he has to infer them using a cen-
sored regression model and data on actual wages paid. In his Table 2, he concludes that a
$1 increase in potential weekly beneﬁts raises the (unobserved) reservation wage by $0.44,
slightly larger than Feldstein and Poterba’s (1984) biggest estimate. There are two main
drawbacks to Fishe’s (1982) approach. First, it seems likely that diﬀerences in unemploy-
ment beneﬁts are driven at least in part by a third factor that is omitted from the regression,
biasing his results. Second, the approach requires some parametric assumptions in order to
infer how observed wages are related to the unobserved latent wage; Fishe (1982) assumes
joint normality of the errors in a wage oﬀer equation and a reservation wage equation.
Once again, more recent data casts doubt on this conclusion. Meyer (1995) studies a
number of experiments in which states subsidized workers who found a job quickly and kept
it for a speciﬁed amount of time; in our framework, this is equivalent to a reduction in
the net unemployment subsidy B and hence should lower both unemployment duration and
reservation wages. Meyer (1995, p. 96) conﬁrms the ﬁrst prediction but concludes that “the
experiments also tend to show that speeding claimants’ return to work does not decrease
total or quarterly earnings following the claim, but the evidence is less strong because the
estimates are imprecise.”18
There are two ways to interpret this result. If unemployment beneﬁts do not aﬀect the
distribution of accepted wages, it suggests that reservation wages are unaﬀected as well.
Of course, this is inconsistent with our model, since we know that ¯ wb is at least equal to
D/(αT + D) ≈ 0.062, regardless of whether workers have liquidity or live hand-to-mouth.
The other possible interpretation is that the reservation wage lies at a value where the
wage distribution has a low density, i.e. F ′( ¯ w) is small. This would make it hard to detect
changes in the distribution of accepted wages resulting from changes in the reservation wage.
Moreover, we can reconcile this with evidence that changes in unemployment beneﬁts aﬀect
unemployment duration by introducing a costly search eﬀort decision; we show in Section 6.4
that our behavioral test extends to this case as well.
18Card, Chetty and Weber (2006) get similar results using administrative data from Austria.
176 Extensions
We think the most attractive feature of the behavioral test for optimal unemployment insur-
ance is that, while it is theoretically well-grounded, it does not rely on much of the structure
of the model. For example, we have already shown that we do not need to know whether
workers have easy access to ﬁnancial markets or no access at all. In this section, we dis-
cuss several modiﬁcations of, and extensions to, our basic framework in order to establish
the robustness of our approach. Each of these modiﬁcations alters the formula for how the
reservation wage reacts to beneﬁts, but none of them substantially changes the behavioral
test in Proposition 4. To simplify the presentation we discuss each new element separately
and keep the mathematical formalities to a minimum.
6.1 Diﬀerent Interest and Discount Rates
To simplify the exposition we have assumed throughout that the interest rate is equal to
the discount rate. While the relationship between r and ρ aﬀects consumption, it is easy to
show that with CARA preferences the eﬀect is simply a level-shift in consumption:




where γ is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. Therefore the objective of the unem-
ployment insurance agency is still to maximize the after-tax reservation wage subject to
the budget constraint in equation (8). Thus, the characterization in equation (11) is un-
changed.19
6.2 Sampling Wages and Job Duration
In our baseline model, we assumed that all jobs last for T periods and are heterogeneous
only in the wage opportunity. We now prove that our results easily extend to the case when
jobs diﬀer both in terms of their wage oﬀer and in terms of their duration.
Suppose that workers sample jobs distinguished by their wage-duration pair (w,T) from
some joint distribution function F(w,T). It is straightforward to prove that workers use a
reservation-wage rule, accepting all jobs that pay at least ¯ w, independent of T. Intuitively, a
worker employed at her reservation wage is indiﬀerent about accepting the job and therefore
19This argument ignores any possible general equilibrium eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts on interest
rates.
18indiﬀerent about how long the job lasts. In particular, an unemployed worker with assets
a is indiﬀerent about accepting a job oﬀering her reservation wage forever, and therefore
consuming ra + ¯ w − τ forever. This pins the value of unemployment, unchanged from
equation (1) in the case with liquidity and equation (5) in the case of ﬁnancial autarky. In
both cases, a worker’s utility is still increasing in the after-tax reservation wage ¯ w − τ.
Optimal unemployment insurance maximizes the after-tax reservation wage subject the
resource constraint, Db = ˆ ατ, where ˆ α is the expected value of αT conditional on the wage




ˆ α + D
(1 + εD,b − εˆ α,b), (13)
where εˆ α,b is the elasticity of ˆ α with respect to beneﬁts. In the limit as r → 0, equation (13)
further reduces to equation (12), while in the special case where w and T are independent,
ˆ α is a constant and so εˆ α,b = 0, leaving equation (11) virtually unchanged.
To see why this matters, suppose that higher wage jobs last longer. Then an increase
in beneﬁts raises employment duration, εˆ α,b > 0. This oﬀsets the increase in unemployment
duration, reducing the elasticity of the unemployment rate and raising the attractiveness of
unemployment insurance. To our knowledge, the existing literature on optimal unemploy-
ment insurance has neglected this possibility.
6.3 Job Loss Risk
To focus on the risk of unemployment duration we have abstracted from job loss risk by
assuming that the duration of a job is known as soon as the job is accepted. In reality, of
course, even after ﬁnding a job, a worker faces uncertainty about its length. To be concrete,
suppose all jobs end according to a Poisson process with arrival rate s.
The arguments behind Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 are unchanged. A worker em-
ployed at her reservation wage faces no uncertainty and therefore wants to keep her con-
sumption constant. If she has liquidity, this means she consumes the annuity value of her
assets plus her after-tax reservation wage. If she is hand-to-mouth, she simply consumes
her after-tax reservation wage. This implies that her utility, and therefore the utility of an
unemployed worker, is an increasing function of her after-tax reservation wage.
The resource constraint changes slightly when job duration is uncertain, so equation (8)
becomes Db = τ/(r+s). Note that 1/(r+s) represents the expected present value of a unit
of income until a job ends, analogous to αT in the baseline model. This introduces a small





(1 + εD,b). (14)
Setting r = 0.001, D = 13.4, s = 1/T = 1/225, and εD,b = 0.88, the right hand side
evaluates to 0.128, slightly larger than the 0.117 obtained when all jobs last for exactly
T periods. Indeed, the only diﬀerence between these numbers comes from discounting. If
r = 0, D/(T + D) and D/(1/s + D) are both equal to the unemployment rate.
6.4 Costly Search
We have so far focused on a worker’s choice of which jobs to accept as the source for the
moral-hazard problem. An alternative approach models workers as making a costly search
eﬀort choice that aﬀects the arrival rate of homogeneous job opportunities. Reality likely
combines both elements; fortunately, so can our model.
To maintain the tractability of our CARA speciﬁcation, we assume that the search eﬀort
is monetary so that the utility function is U(c − v(e)) for some disutility of eﬀort function
v(e). Eﬀort e improves the arrival of job opportunities λ(e).
With this speciﬁcation, any constant beneﬁt system (b,τ) induces workers to choose a
constant level of eﬀort e∗, independent of their wealth level. Eﬀectively this reduces unem-
ployment income by v(e∗). While this naturally alters the reservation wage equation (4),
it does not aﬀect the value of an unemployed worker conditional on her reservation wage,
which is unchanged from equation (1) and equation (5). Duration is now aﬀected by policy
through two channels, the arrival rate of job oﬀers λ(e) and the acceptance probability of
each 1 − F(¯ w), but this does not modify the agency’s budget constraint equation (8). It
follows that Proposition 4 is unchanged by a monetary cost of search: our derivation of
equation (11) uses the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to beneﬁts, but the
reason why beneﬁts aﬀect unemployment duration is immaterial.
We can also allow employed workers to decide how much to work. Suppose that a worker
oﬀered a wage w and choosing work eﬀort e earns ew at disutility v(e). Then she optimally
sets e to solve v′(e(w)) = w and so the model is isomorphic to one in which she draws income
e(w)w − v(e(w)) with no disutility of eﬀort.
206.5 Employed Workers and Redistributive Motives
Our analysis has so far focused on optimal insurance for an unemployed worker. We now
extend the analysis to consider employed workers. We focus on the case where the worker
has perfect access to ﬁnancial markets.
To start, consider designing insurance for a worker who is initially employed at a wage
w with t periods remaining on her job. One simple way to achieve the optimum is to allow
the worker to defer entry into the optimal scheme for an unemployed worker. The worker
pays no tax until she next becomes unemployed; thereafter, she receives beneﬁt b whenever
she is unemployed and pays tax τ whenever she is employed. If the worker quits her job at
time s ≤ t to become unemployed, her lifetime utility in consumption units is
ra + (1 − e
−rs)w + e
−rs( ¯ w − τ). (15)
It follows that the worker keeps her job (sets s = t) if w ≥ ¯ w − τ and quits it immediately
otherwise (s = 0), which is the socially eﬃcient choice. We conclude that employed workers
also wish to maximize ¯ w − τ and so demand the same b∗ and τ∗ as the unemployed.
Now suppose there is initially a mix of employed and unemployed workers, potentially
with diﬀerent asset levels, wages and remaining job durations. Given the alignment of
opinions over beneﬁts, the scheme just described is Pareto eﬃcient. By construction it also
involves no redistribution and so everyone agrees on the unemployment beneﬁt level.
Most unemployment beneﬁt schemes oﬀer both insurance and redistribution, which nat-
urally breaks the agreement between employed and unemployed workers. One way to ensure
agreement on unemployment beneﬁts is to rely on other taxes to take care of any desired
redistribution. To see this, suppose that the unemployment insurance beneﬁts b and taxes τ
take eﬀect immediately, but that workers must also pay an initial lump-sum tax κ(t) − αtτ
conditional on their remaining job duration t, which we assume is observable; an unemployed











dG(t) = 0, (16)
where G(t) is the given initial distribution over job durations. For a worker earning a wage
w with t periods remaining in her job, welfare in consumption units is
r(a − κ(t)) + (1 − e
−rt)w + e
−rt( ¯ w − τ) (17)
21Setting κ(t) = 0 implies that welfare is equivalent to equation (15). Thus, lump-sum transfers
can imitate the previous scheme.
Since there is Ricardian equivalence in this environment, we may without loss of generality
restrict attention to tax and beneﬁt schemes such that
R ∞
0 κ(t)dG(t) = 0 so the budget
constraint equation (16) is equivalent to equation (8). In this case κ(t) is the net lump-sum
tax, after each worker has paid her own cost of unemployment insurance. Equation (17)
implies everyone agrees on maximizing ¯ w − τ, independent of the redistribution chosen by
κ(t). In other words, given these instruments, all Pareto eﬃcient policies maximize ¯ w − τ,
regardless of redistributional concerns. The same is true of more sophisticated lump-sum
transfers that may potentially depend additionally on the initial wage w or assets a.
This analysis highlights an important point: unemployment insurance is, at best, a crude
redistributional tool and will not be used as such if sharper instruments, such as the lump-
sum taxes κ(t), are available. When this is the case, the optimal level of beneﬁts will not
depend on redistributive concerns. For most of the paper, to focus on insurance rather than
redistribution, we assume either that there is no redistributional motive or that the agency
has access to lump-sum taxes.
6.6 Worker Heterogeneity with Lump-Sum Transfers
Up to this point we have considered the problem of an insurance agency confronted with a
single type of worker. The analysis is also immediately applicable if there are many types
of workers, and the agency can tailor the unemployment insurance design to each. We
now consider worker heterogeneity but assume that there can be only one unemployment
insurance policy that applies to all workers.
Let there be ﬁnitely many types of workers denoted by n = 1,2,...N with population
fractions πn. We allow the distribution of wages F n(w), the duration of jobs T n, and the
risk aversion parameter γn to depend on the worker type. We assume the availability of
lump-sum taxes that depend on the worker type n and remaining employment duration t,
with unemployment again corresponding to t = 0. Let κn(t) − αtτ denote this lump-sum.
As before, Ricardian equivalence allows us to restrict attention to tax and beneﬁt schemes
where
PN
n=1 πn R ∞
0 κn(t)dGn(t) = 0, so κn(t) represents the redistribution net of that done
by unemployment insurance policy.
Let ¯ wn be type n’s reservation wage. Following the analysis from Section 6.5 closely,
22welfare for type (n,t) workers expressed in consumption units is
r(a − κ

















0 e−rtdGn(t). Because lump-sum transfers κn(t) can achieve any redistri-







n − τ), (19)
while taxes and beneﬁts solve the budget constraint equation (18).






n(b,τ) − τ, (20)
which we treat as an approximation for r > 0 but small. Similarly, the budget constraint






τT n − bDn(b,τ)
T n + Dn(b,τ)
￿
= 0.
Equivalently, a type n worker spends a fraction Dn(b,τ)/(T n + Dn(b,τ)) of her life unem-
ployed and the rest employed, so the budget constraint requires that u(b,τ)b = (1−u(b,τ))τ,
as in equation (9), where u(b,τ) is the population unemployment rate when the unemploy-
ment insurance policy is (b,τ).
Our behavioral test for optimal unemployment insurance easily generalizes to this envi-
ronment. Unemployment beneﬁts maximize equation (20), with taxes adjusting to balance
















This is a natural generalization of equation (12). We need to know the average response of
23reservation wages to beneﬁts in the population, the unemployment rate, and the elasticity
of the unemployment rate with respect to beneﬁts to perform this test.
6.7 Worker Heterogeneity without Lump-Sum Transfers
We now comment on what occurs if the agency cannot redistribute using a lump-sum tax or
any other instrument. For example, suppose there are two types of workers n = 1,2, with
type 1 having the higher unemployment rate so that unemployment beneﬁts redistribute
from type 2 to type 1 workers. Varying beneﬁts b and adjusting taxes τ(b) in a budget




. Any point on the northeastern
portion of this set of utility points is eﬃcient. The associated set of eﬃcient beneﬁt levels
b may be quite wide and include values that do not lie between the individually optimal
levels for both type 1 and 2. This may occur because beneﬁts are no longer necessarily paid
by the party that receives them. This discussion illustrates that when redistributive devices
are severely limited it is hard to say much about eﬃcient unemployment insurance, as this
instrument may have to carry the full weight of redistribution.
Although general conclusions are hard to obtain, if we are willing to quantify the dis-
tributional concerns we can modify our test for optimal unemployment insurance. Suppose
for the sake of simplicity that all workers types n = 1,2,...,N are initially unemployed, so
that their welfare is directly related to ¯ wn −τ, as well as the contribution from assets which








where the weights λn are normalized so that
PN
n=1 πnλn = 1. These weights determine
the desire for redistribution: the ratio λj/λi represents the rate at which we are willing to
transfer goods from type j to type i workers, i.e. the tolerable size of the hole in the “leaking
bucket” that takes goods from j to i. When lump-sum transfers are available this rate must
be unity and λn = 1.














so that some weighted average of the increase in reservation wages must equal the term
24capturing the increase in taxes required to ﬁnance a rise in beneﬁts. The test is modiﬁed in




















Both sides of this equation are zero when lump-sum taxes are available; when they are not,
the right-hand side adds a correction that accounts for the redistributive role unemployment
beneﬁts can play. Diﬀerences in responsiveness of the reservation wage to beneﬁts ¯ wn
b are
crucial: workers who gain more from an increase in beneﬁts are those whose reservation wage
rises most. Reservation wages emerge again as an element in the diagnostic of unemployment
insurance policy, even when an allowance is made for its distributive role.
6.8 Temporary Layoﬀs
We have assumed throughout this paper that unemployed workers never return to their
old employer. In reality, many unemployment spells end when a worker is recalled to her
previous job. Following Burdett and Mortensen (1978), Pissarides (1982), and Katz (1986),
we allow for this possibility by distinguishing unemployed workers according to their last
wage w0 and allowing that an unemployed worker may be recalled to that wage according
to a Poisson process with arrival rate µ. We continue to assume that unemployed workers
get new wage oﬀers at rate λ. Once a new oﬀer is accepted, the worker loses access to her
previous wage.
The possibility of recall implies that a worker’s reservation wage is an increasing function
of her past wage, ¯ w(w0); the precise formula is a slight complication of equation (4) (liquid-
ity) or equation (7) (hand-to-mouth). More importantly for us, the utility of an unemployed
worker is still equal to the annuity value of her assets plus her after-tax reservation wage.
It follows that if lump-sum transfers are available to address any distributional concerns, all
workers agree on maximizing the average after-tax reservation wage. In other words, tempo-
rary layoﬀs introduce ex post heterogeneity, but the test for the optimality of unemployment
insurance is identical to the one in an economy with ex ante heterogeneous workers.
256.9 Finite Beneﬁt Eligibility
We have assumed until now that beneﬁts last forever. In reality, most unemployment beneﬁt
systems pay only for a speciﬁed amount of time; in the United States, this is typically 6
months. After this, a worker must be employed for some months before she is eligible to
collect beneﬁts again. Our analysis readily extends to this case.
When beneﬁts fall with the duration of unemployment, there are two reasons why a
worker is willing to take a job: she earns a wage and she resets her eligibility for beneﬁts.20 To
see why this matters, recall our intuition for why the after-tax reservation wage summarizes
a worker’s utility: an unemployed worker is indiﬀerent between remaining unemployed and
working forever at the after-tax wage ¯ w−τ; and the utility of a working forever at a constant
wage is just the annuity value of assets plus the wage. But an unemployed worker may be
willing to take a bad job just long enough to reset her beneﬁt eligibility but unwilling to keep
the job forever. That is, she has two diﬀerent reservation wages, a low one for a job that she
can quit when she resets her beneﬁt eligibility and high one for a job that she is willing to
keep past that point. Only the higher reservation wage informs us about her utility.
For a newly unemployed worker with maximum eligibility, the two reservation wages are
the same. A worker with maximum eligibility takes a job only if she is willing to keep it
forever since taking a job and later quitting does not increase her beneﬁt eligibility. This
implies that when beneﬁts fall with the duration of unemployment, we should examine the
responsiveness of a newly unemployed worker’s after-tax reservation wage to beneﬁts.
While we do not know of any direct evidence on how the responsiveness of reservation
wages to beneﬁts changes with unemployment duration,21 search theory suggests that when
beneﬁt duration is ﬁnite, newly unemployed workers should be more responsive to a change
in beneﬁts than workers who have used up part or all of their eligibility (van den Berg, 1990).
For example, consider a worker who has been unemployed for a long time and is no longer
eligible for beneﬁts. Raising beneﬁts will actually lower such a worker’s reservation wage
since it encourages her to accept a mediocre job in order to renew eligibility.
20A similar logic and similar conclusions hold if the search environment is nonstationary for other reasons,
for example because the arrival rate of job oﬀers declines during an unemployment spell.
21Most of the studies summarized in Section 5 measure the average response of reservation wages to
beneﬁts; van den Berg (1990) is an exception.
267 A Consumption-Response Test
The goal of this section is to link our model with existing tests for optimal unemployment
insurance which are based on the response of consumption to becoming unemployed (Baily,
1978; Gruber, 1997; Chetty, 2006). To do this, we return to the benchmark model of Section 2
and show how we can use the full structure to derive a test linking the decline in consumption
during an unemployment spell to risk aversion and the elasticity of unemployment duration
with respect to beneﬁts. Our exact test depends on whether workers have liquidity. If
they do, our test looks at the average drop in consumption during an unemployment spell.
In the hand-to-mouth model our test examines the diﬀerence in consumption between an
unemployed worker and a worker employed at her reservation wage. Each of the extensions
analyzed in Section 6 would further modify our consumption-response tests since, in contrast
to our behavioral test, these tests build on the full structure of the model including the
determinants of consumption and reservation wages.
7.1 Workers with Liquidity
We start with the case when workers have access to ﬁnancial markets. In this case, our
consumption-response test relates the speed of decline in consumption to the elasticity of
unemployment duration with respect to unemployment beneﬁts:
Proposition 5 Assume workers have access to ﬁnancial markets. If unemployment beneﬁts


















where σ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion evaluated at the consumption level at the
start of the unemployment spell, σ = γcu(a0).
The proof is in the appendix.
As in most consumption-response tests, this optimality condition relates the average
decline in consumption to the elasticity of duration with respect to beneﬁts, but there are
27some important diﬀerences: (i) we use the partial elasticity εD,b whereas previous studies
have used the total elasticity deﬁned in footnote 13; (ii) the expression describes the average
decline in consumption during an unemployment spell; and (iii) the elasticity expression is
somewhat diﬀerent than in previous work.
These points need clariﬁcation. First we use the partial elasticity holding taxes ﬁxed
because we believe this corresponds to the empirical evidence on the responsiveness of un-
employment duration to unemployment beneﬁts summarized in Section 5. Turning now to
point (ii), Baily’s (1978) original analysis and Gruber’s (1997) subsequent work focus on
the discrete drop in consumption between employment and unemployment. For example, in
his empirical implementation of Baily’s (1978) test, Gruber (1997) uses PSID data to look
at the drop in food consumption for a worker who is employed in year t and unemployed
in year t + 1. Point (iii) is now easily explained. In these papers the optimality condition
equates some measure from consumption data to the elasticity of duration. Instead, we ﬁnd
an expression involving the elasticity, but not equal to it. Since the consumption measures
diﬀer, it should not be surprising that the optimality conditions call for equating these to
diﬀerent expressions involving the elasticity.
To implement this test, we plug the usual values r = 0.001, T = 225, D = 13.4, and εD,b =
0.88 into equation (22). In addition, assume that the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion at
the start of the unemployment spell is σ = 2. Then the model predicts that consumption
should decline by 25 percent during an unemployment spell if the unemployment beneﬁt
level is optimal. If instead the observed decline in consumption is smaller, a decrease in
unemployment beneﬁts would raise welfare.
We know of no direct evidence on the magnitude of the decline in consumption during
an unemployment spell, but there is some indirect evidence based on food consumption and
expenditure. Gruber (1997) reports that food expenditures fall by about 6.8 percent when
a worker is employed one year and unemployed the next. Aguiar and Hurst (2005) ﬁnd that
the unemployed spend 19 percent less on food than do the employed using cross-sectional
data; however, because of an increase in time spent on shopping and food preparation, this
translates into only a 5 percent drop in food consumption. Of course, since the income
elasticity of food consumption is less than 1, it seems likely that the expenditure on and
consumption of other goods declines more than this during an unemployment spell. In
addition, even if food consumption could proxy for total consumption, these measures do
not generally represent the average decline during a spell.
287.2 Hand-to-Mouth Workers
We now turn to hand-to-mouth workers. In this case, our test relates the diﬀerence in
consumption between a worker at the reservation wage, ¯ waut−τ, and an unemployed worker,
b, to the elasticity of unemployment duration:
Proposition 6 Assume workers must consume their income in each period. If unemploy-
ment beneﬁts are chosen optimally, the diﬀerence between the consumption of an employed
worker at the reservation wage and the consumption of an unemployed worker is
1
γ
log(1 + εD,b) (23)
Equivalently, the percentage drop in consumption when a worker loses a job paying her reser-




where σ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion evaluated at the consumption level of a
worker earning the reservation wage, ¯ waut − τ.
The proof is in the appendix.
Once again, there are three important diﬀerences between our condition and most existing
formulas based on the response of consumption to unemployment: (i) we use the partial
elasticity εD,b; (ii) we use the diﬀerence between the lowest acceptable level of consumption
while employed and consumption while unemployed, rather than the average diﬀerence; and
(iii) the ﬁnal expression is slightly diﬀerent than in previous work, with log(1 + ε) rather
than ε.
Given the usual values of εD,b = 0.88 and σ = 2, the critical question in the hand-to-
mouth model is whether the consumption of a worker employed at her reservation wage
is 32 percent more than the consumption of unemployed workers. To measure this, we
need to know both the drop in consumption following unemployment and the worker’s
reservation wage. Data on food expenditures and consumption from Gruber (1997) and
Aguiar and Hurst (2005) suggest that many workers are willing to take jobs that raise their
consumption by less than 32 percent, so workers are currently over-insured.
In our view, there are three drawbacks to the consumption-response tests we have pre-
sented here. The ﬁrst is that the moments of the consumption data that we should look at
depend on the structure of ﬁnancial markets. The second is the unavailability of reliable,
29high frequency consumption data for goods other than food. Finally, the behavioral test
is robust to assumptions like the predictability of job loss and the extent of heterogeneity.
Introducing these modiﬁcations is likely to further change the consumption-response tests.
Chetty (2006) derives another consumption-based test that does not rely heavily on the
structure of the model and is identical in the hand-to-mouth and liquidity cases. This test
tells us to compare the average lifetime marginal utility of a worker when employed and when
unemployed. To implement such a test, we either need a very rich data set on the lifetime
path of consumption for a large panel of individuals or we have to make some assumption
about the economic environment so that we can extrapolate the desired moments from a
limited data set.
8 Conclusions
This paper argues that the after-tax reservation wage measures the well-being of unemployed
workers. Any policy that raises the average after-tax reservation wage is therefore beneﬁcial,
and the beneﬁt can be measured by the average increase in the after-tax reservation wage.
While we have applied this mainly to thinking about optimal unemployment insurance, the
insight is more general. For example, Proposition 3 shows that the after-tax reservation wage
encodes the value of liquidity. Going beyond this paper, when evaluating any policy towards
the unemployed—examples include severance payments, reemployment bonuses, training
subsidies, and job search centers—the key question is whether the policy raises the after-tax
reservation wage.
We have assumed CARA preferences throughout the body of this paper. This assumption
is convenient but probably not essential. Proposition 2 shows that the after-tax reservation
wage measures a hand-to-mouth worker’s welfare regardless of her preferences. Moreover, in
our companion paper Shimer and Werning (2005), we argue that the behavior of a worker
with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences is quantitatively similar to that of
a worker with CARA preferences and the same coeﬃcient of risk aversion if both workers
have access to liquidity. Indeed, our intuition for the proof of Proposition 1 explains why
this is true: the only reason the after-tax reservation wage would not measure the welfare
of an unemployed worker is if workers are willing to take jobs temporarily but not perma-
nently. While this is a theoretical possibility, we doubt that the phenomenon is quantitatively
important.
Finally, our paper implies that a key empirical issue is the responsiveness of the reserva-
30tion wage to unemployment beneﬁts or other labor market policies. Some existing estimates
suggest that reservation wages are very responsive, implying huge gains from increasing
unemployment beneﬁt levels. Other estimates are much smaller and imply current beneﬁt
levels are too high. An important goal for future research should be to obtain more precise
estimates of how labor market policies aﬀect reservation wages.
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A Proof of Proposition 1








where V (a,t,w) is the value of an employed worker with assets a, t periods remaining on
the job, and a wage w. We prove this for the general case where r and ρ are not necessarily






where the expectation is taken using all the information available when cs is chosen. With




Now consider the lifetime utility Vs at time s of a worker facing some stochastic future
















The second equation uses equation (25) while the third equation solves the integral.
Shape of the Consumption and Value Functions. The shapes of the consumption and
value functions follow immediately from equation (24). It is feasible for a worker with assets
a to consume ra more than a worker with assets 0 and vice-versa, assuming the two have
the same employment duration and wage. This implies
c(a,t,w) = ra + c(0,t,w). (26)
Next, consider two employed workers, one at a wage w and another at a wage w′. If each
has t periods remaining in his job, the present value (as of the end of the previous period)






−rsds ≡ αt(w − w
′).
If the present value diﬀerence happens to equal the diﬀerence in the two workers’ asset levels,
they have the same resources and will behave the same:
c(a,t,w) = c(a + αt(w − w
′),t,w
′).
Combining with equation (26) gives
c(a,t,w) = r
￿






Note that if the job is ﬁnished, t = 0 and α0 = 0, the worker is unemployed so c(a,0,w) =
c(a,0,w′) for all w and w′. It is convenient to deﬁne cu(a) ≡ c(a,0,w) as the consumption
of a worker who starts a period unemployed and Vu(a) ≡ V (a,0,w) as her value function.
Reservation Wage. Consider a worker who accepts a job at wage w. Her value function
is V (a,T,w) and so she takes the job if V (a,T,w) ≥ Vu(a). Using equation (24), this is
equivalent to c(a,T,w) ≥ cu(a), which by equation (26) implies a reservation wage rule,
independent of assets, satisfying
c(0,T, ¯ w) = cu(0). (28)
Combine equation (28) with equation (27), evaluated at w′ = ¯ w, to get a convenient expres-
sion for the consumption of a newly employed worker:
c(a,T,w) = r
￿
a + αT(w − ¯ w)
￿
+ cu(0). (29)
Behavior of the Employed. A worker who starts a period with t ≥ 0 periods remaining
in her job faces no uncertainty until the job ends and therefore keeps consumption constant.




where ˙ a(t) = ra + w − τ − c(a(t),t,w) is the rate of increase in assets. Diﬀerentiating gives
ca(a,t,w)
￿
ra + w − τ − c(a,t,w)
￿
= ct(a,t,w),
33where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Note from equation (27) that ca(a,t,w) = r, so
this is a diﬀerential equation for c as a function of t with terminal condition equation (29).
The solution is







rαT(w − ¯ w) + cu(0)
￿
(30)
This provides an alternate expression for c(a,0,w), which we know is equal ra + cu(0).
Simplifying this equality pins down the constant in the consumption function,
cu(0) = ¯ w − τ. (31)
Substituting equation (31) into equation (29) yields the consumption functions for unem-
ployed and employed workers found in equation (2) and equation (3), while substituting
these into equation (24) gives the value of an unemployed worker in equation (1). All that
remains is to determine the worker’s reservation wage.














where ˙ a = ra + b − cu(a) = B − ¯ w using equation (31). Since U′′(c) = −γU′(c) = γ2U(c)
and c′
u(a) = r, we can rewrite this as







Next, use U(c1)/U(c2) = −U(c1 − c2) and U(0) = −1 to get











Simplifying using equation (29) yields equation (4). This completes the characterization of
worker behavior in Proposition 1. ￿
34B Proof of Proposition 2
We use a pair of recursive equations. Let V aut
u denote the expected utility of an unemployed
worker living under autarky and let V aut(w,T) denote the corresponding value for a newly-
employed worker at a wage w. These solve
ρV
aut




















The ﬂow value of an unemployed worker comes from her current utility U(b). In addition, at
rate λ she gets a wage draw w which she may accept, giving capital gain V aut(w,T) − V aut
u ,
or reject. An employed worker in a new job earns U(w −τ) for the next T periods and then
has continuation value V aut
u .











since ρ = r, so the reservation wage solves U( ¯ waut − τ) = ρV aut
u . Equivalently, the lifetime
utility of an unemployed worker is given by equation (5). Substituting this into the Bellman
equation for an unemployed worker gives equation (6) for the reservation wage. ￿
C Proof of Proposition 3
We start with two inequalities. At any w ≥ ˜ w,
−U(B − ˜ w) − 1 = exp(γ(˜ w − B)) − 1 > γ(˜ w − B),
1 + U(rαT(w − ˜ w)) ≥ rαT(1 + U(w − ˜ w)).
The ﬁrst equality uses the deﬁnition of U and the ﬁrst inequality uses convexity of the
exponential function. To prove the second inequality, note that 1 − y ≥ e−xy − ye−x when
x > 0 and y ∈ [0,1]. When x = 0, this is trivially true. Moreover, the derivative of the
right-hand-side with respect to x is y(e−x − e−xy). Since y ∈ [0,1] and x ≥ 0, x ≥ xy and
hence e−x ≤ e−xy, so the right-hand-side is decreasing in x. Hence the inequality holds for
any positive x. If x = γ(w − ˜ w) > 0 and y = rαT ∈ [0,1], this is equivalent to the desired
35inequality.
Now suppose ¯ w solves equation (4). The previous inequalities imply









1 + U(w − ¯ w)
￿
dF(w).
It is easy to conﬁrm that the ﬁrst expression is decreasing in ¯ w and the last expression is
increasing, so the solution to
−U(B − ¯ w








requires ¯ waut < ¯ w. Under CARA utility, U(c1 + c2) = −U(c1)U(c2), so this is equivalent to
the reservation wage equation (7).
Finally, under ﬁnancial autarky, equation (5) shows that an unemployed worker’s utility is
U( ¯ waut−τ)/ρ. With access to ﬁnancial markets, equation (1) shows that it is U(ra+ ¯ w−τ)/ρ.
The worker is indiﬀerent to the scenarios if a = ( ¯ waut− ¯ w)/r, a reduction in assets that lowers
the worker’s consumption by ra = ¯ waut − ¯ w in every future period. ￿
D Proof of Proposition 5
First take the partial derivative with respect to b of both sides of equation (4), holding ﬁxed
the tax rate τ:




′(rαT(w − ¯ w))dF(w).
Since U′(c) = −γU(c), we can eliminate the integral using equation (4). Solving this expres-
sion for B = b + τ gives











Second, note that while a worker is unemployed, assets fall at rate ˙ a = ra+b−cu(a) = B− ¯ w,
where the second equality uses equation (2). Since a unit decrease in assets reduces cu(a)
by r, consumption falls linearly during an unemployment spell, ˙ cu = r(B − ¯ w). Substitute












36This holds for any tax and beneﬁt policy. At the optimal policy, we can eliminate ¯ wb using
equation (11) to get








Finally, if an unemployment spell lasts for t periods, the drop in consumption is ˙ cut. The
density of the duration of an unemployment spell is e−t/D/D, so the expected drop in con-





dt = D˙ cu.
Combining these equations completes the proof. ￿
E Proof of Proposition 6


























The left-hand-side is zero if beneﬁts are chosen optimally, to maximize ¯ waut(b,τ(b)) − τ(b).
Then use equation (10) to eliminate τ′(b) from the right-hand-side:
U′(b)





where the denominator on the left-hand-side is the expectation of the marginal utility of
consumption conditional on the wage drawn from F exceeding ¯ waut.
Under CARA utility, this simpliﬁes further since the ratio of marginal utility is the same
as the ratio of utility,
U(b)





Since equation (6) implies
U(b)







37the previous two equations give
U(b)
U( ¯ waut − τ)
= 1 + εD,b.
Since U(c) = −e−γc, the result follows immediately. ￿
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